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INTRODUCTION 
Written while teaching at the University of Wisconsin Law School, 
Professor Stewart Macaulay’s 1963 article, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study,1 revolutionized contracts scholarship by 
highlighting that contract was only one variable among others that parties 
 
   Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. Bob Gordon, Bill Whitford, and Stewart 
Macaulay have been wonderful teachers and mentors. David Campbell, Brian Bix, and 
Mitu Gulati provided valuable insights. Jilly Fox and Alexa Shook rendered marvelous 
research assistance. 
1.  Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55 (1963). 
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could choose to govern exchange.2 His work led to a paradigm shift away 
from a world where contract law was a self-contained, effective, and 
costless way of regulating exchange to a world where comparative 
institutional governance determines when parties rely on contract and 
when they use alternate institutions.3 Macaulay’s businesspeople relied on 
the alternate institution of informal adjustment without legal coercion.4 
Macaulay’s focus on institutional choice5 influenced scholarship in 
several ways. First, it implicitly suggested that a cost comparison strategy 
underlies institutional choice. Second, once this richer world of informal 
enforcement emerged as a way to manage exchange, scholars were 
inspired to study the ways in which firms combine informal and formal 
enforcement. Third, by focusing on the functional goals driving parties’ 
choice of governance, Macaulay reoriented contract law away from pure 
doctrine. He also encouraged contract design theorists to consider how 
institutional mechanisms within contracts (but not oriented to performance 
obligations or sanctions) could solve durable problems in exchange. This 
reconceptualized contract law. Fourth, by focusing on informal adjustment 
as an institutional choice, Macaulay’s work not only inspired studies of 
private governance as a fact6 but also caused scholars to explore why 
 
 2.  Id. at 56. The idea of choice has played a large role in economics because 
“[e]conomics throughout the twentieth century ha[ve] been developed predominantly as a 
science of choice.” Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance 
Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 172 (2002). Choice developed 
as a response to scarcity. But new perspectives pushed contract and private governance as 
an alternative to markets. Private governance emphasizes “different kinds of transactions 
with discrete modes of governance in an economizing way.” Id. at 175. This choice in 
governance has roots in Macaulay. See Elizabeth Mertz & Lawrence M. Friedman, Law in 
Reality, Law in Context: On the Work and Influence of Stewart Macaulay, in STEWART 
MACAULAY: SELECTED WORKS 15, 23 (David Campbell ed., 2020) (suggesting that 
economists studying Macaulay believe that parties are making “choices, on efficiency 
grounds, of particular modes of enforcement”). 
 3.  His work contributed to the rich scholarship of new institutional economics. 
See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000). The study of institutional economics may have 
begun with Ronald Coase: “It is commonly said, and it may be true, that the new 
institutional economics started with my article, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) with its 
explicit introduction of transaction costs into economic analysis.” Ronald Coase, The New 
Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72, 72 (1998). 
 4.  Macaulay did not envision a world without the impact of law, since law 
could influence settlements and disputes. See Macaulay, supra note 1, at 62; see also Barak 
D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 744 
(2012) (situating the private governance of Macaulay within the “shadow of the law”). 
 5.  Robert Gordon noted a political aspect to the conflict among institutions, 
noting that Macaulay “sees common law contract courts as simply one among the many 
institutional battlegrounds on which the parties carry on their struggle.” See Robert W. 
Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 573.  
 6.  Robert W. Gordon, Is the World of Contracting Relations One of 
Spontaneous Order or Pervasive State Action? Stewart Macaulay Scrambles the Public-
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private ordering arose, the preconditions for success, and the possibility of 
failure (suggesting the limits of private governance). Fifth, Macaulay’s 
work led to a burgeoning field exploring customs as purposive, non-legal 
solutions to problems, sparking inquiries into how law, customs, and 
contract coexist to solve exchange problems. 
Macaulay’s work makes three other major contributions, each of 
which is important itself, but that also tie into this paradigm shift. These 
contributions include: First, Macaulay’s insight that parties choose 
informal governance over contract because of cost (broadly conceived) 
revealed a world of other transaction costs and frictions that led to a more 
realistic model of human behavior and exchange. This influenced scholars 
to assess their effects as impediments to complete contracting and possible 
institutional solutions.7 Second, Macaulay’s law-in-action focus on 
context8 matters for two reasons: it determines which institution can best 
solve exchange problems and also suggests that courts should adopt a less 
formalistic approach to contract interpretation and gap-filling. Third, his 
focus on institutions outside contract law suggests that lawyers must 
assume a broader role that goes beyond contract drafting for allocating 
risks and performance.9  
I. CHOICE IN GOVERNANCE (IN FIVE PARTS) 
Macaulay’s vivid real-world examples in which businessmen avoid 
one institution (contract) and embrace another (informal adjustment)10 
sparked scholars in different fields to consider why and when parties 
would embrace a variety of institutions to govern their exchange.11 After 
Macaulay, a formal contract would no longer be viewed as an inevitable 
necessity for governing exchange, but rather as one of many institutions 
 
Private Distinction, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: 
ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 49, 59 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. 
Whitford eds., 2013). 
7.  See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 16 (1990) (exploring the “underlying determinants of human 
behavior, the costs of transacting, and the makeup of institutions”). 
 8.  See Brian H. Bix, The Role of Contract: Stewart Macaulay’s Lessons from 
Practice (discussing context to include “assumptions that we do not articulate, operating 
just underneath our beliefs about the world”), in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP 
OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL, supra note 6, at 241, 247. 
 9.  Lisa Bernstein & Brad Peterson, Managerial Contracting: A Preliminary 
Study 9 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 10.  This focus on informal governance is part of “an effort to implement the 
‘study of good order and workable arrangements,’ where good order includes both 
spontaneous order in the market, which is a venerated tradition in economics . . . and 
intentional order[.]” Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 1 (2005).  
 11.  Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and 
Implications, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 195, 195 (1984). 
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that parties could choose to use. This led to a choice in institutional 
governance and a change in perspective, causing economists to wonder, 
“why do we observe so much organizational variety[?]”12 Macaulay’s 
illumination of this sort of thinking about institutional choice made a 
seminal contribution.13 The 1,311 citations to Macaulay14 powerfully 
demonstrate that. 
Moreover, Macaulay’s study of informal adjustment opened up the 
world of institutions in exchange and contributed to the development of 
new institutional economics. It prompted North, Ostrom, Smith, Greif, 
Dixit, and others to study the purposes institutions serve,15 as well as how 
institutions guide behavior,16 lower the cost of exchange,17 and enhance 
economic performance.18 
The focus on institutions that Macaulay prompted  changed 
economists’ views of the production economy. Previously, economists 
resisted studying institutions in assessing the costs of a production 
economy despite Coase’s insight that “when it is costly to transact, 
institutions matter.”19 Economists had accepted firms and organizations as 
 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Perhaps the success of Macaulay’s approach can be best explained by Ken 
Arrow, who sees the new institutionalists as successful in a way that the older 
institutionalists were not because of their willingness to tackle “why economic institutions 
[have] emerged the way they did and not otherwise[.]” Williamson, supra note 3, 596 
(quoting Kenneth J. Arrow, Reflections on the Essays, in ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY 734 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987) (alteration to match 
original)).  
 14. Macaulay, Stewart, HeinOnline, https://heinonline-
org.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/HOL/AuthorProfile?action=edit&search_name=Macaulay%
2C%20Stewart&collection=journals (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). Of course, not only did 
Macaulay’s work influence others, but there was cross pollination as well. See, e.g., Stewart 
Macaulay, Freedom from Contract: Solutions In Search of a Problem?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
777, 778–91 (discussing his admiration for Robert Scott’s work). As Mitu Gulati points 
out, other legal scholars may not have had the same influence on economics scholarship. 
Email from Mitu Gulati, Professor of L., Duke Univ. Sch. of L., to author (Dec. 20, 2020, 
8:03 AM) (on file with author).  
15.  Juliet P. Kostritsky, Everett D. & Eugenis S. McCurdy Professor of Cont. L. 
& Dir. of the Ctr. for Bus. L., Case W. Rsrv. Univ. Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the 
Wisconsin Law Review Symposium: Wisconsin’s Intellectual History and Traditions (Oct. 
23, 2020) (transcript on file with Wisconsin Law Review), https://youtu.be/d8q2VNBToE0 
[https://perma.cc/X87A-S3JF]. 
16.  Id. 
 17.  North concluded that institutions act as a means to reduce uncertainty and 
provide “constraints [that] reduce the costs of human interaction.” NORTH, supra note 7, at 
25, 36. 
 18.  Id. at 133–35, 137. 
 19.  Id. at 12 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 15 (1960)). 
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the product of technology20 and economies of scale.21 Macaulay’s insights 
into institutional choice deviated from the view that “the distribution of 
economic activity across firm and market organization [was accepted] as 
given” and “coordinated by . . . price[.]”22 His work on institutional 
alternatives thus encouraged the new institutional economists to focus on 
how parties choose to organize their economic exchanges in order to 
coordinate their economic activity within and across firms.23 
Macaulay’s idea of institutional choice also led economists, using the 
structure of comparative usefulness that he pioneered, to explore the 
boundaries of the firm in new ways.24 They identified a new institutional 
choice in which firms abandoned contract as a governance mechanism and 
embraced vertical integration.25 Economists who focused on the problems 
and characteristics of parties and of the transaction, including 
opportunism, looked at institutional choice and concluded that vertical 
integration might solve problems of opportunism better than external 
contracts when bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism 
converged.26 Thus, under certain circumstances, the parties might avoid 
contract altogether and opt for vertical integration.27 
Oliver Williamson followed Macaulay in comparing institutions, but 
instead of assessing contract sanctions and informal adjustment, 
Williamson contrasted market and hierarchy, while also considering 
bargaining impediments and transactional characteristics like sunk costs.28 
While a market transaction might work well in a setting where goods can 
be examined before purchase, as buyers and sellers entered long-distance 
sales, precluding pre-sale examinations, opportunistic delivery of 
 
 20.  Williamson addressed claims that “technology is determinative of economic 
organization” but disputes them and explains the boundaries of the firm in terms of 
“economizing on transaction costs.” Williamson, supra note 10, at 10, 15. 
 21.  Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff & Peter Temin, Beyond Markets 
and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. 
REV. 404, 405 (2003) (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE 
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 8 (1977)). 
 22.  Williamson, supra note 10, at 3 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387 (1937)).  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  The Chandlerian view of the firm explained the boundaries of the firm in 
terms of technology and economies of scale. Lamoreaux, Raff & Temin, supra note 21, at 
405 (citing CHANDLER, supra note 21, at 8–9). 
 25.  NORTH, supra note 7, at 53. 
 26.  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 66–67 (1985).  
27.  NORTH, supra note 7, at 53. 
28.  See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIO. 481, 488, 493–94 (1985), for a discussion on and 
critique of Williamson’s arguments regarding economic transactional costs between 
market and hierarchical firms and suggesting a neglect of “social relations.” 
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substandard goods needed to be controlled. The institution of hierarchy 
provided advantages in controlling these sorts of quality problems.29 
The paradigm shift toward analyzing exchange and problem solving 
in terms of institutional choice led Elinor Ostrom to conduct a granular 
analysis of what institutions are best suited for managing common pool 
resources.30 Traditionally, economists assumed that government was 
needed “to impose rules and taxes to force self-interested individuals to 
contribute[.]”31 But by studying water systems, Ostrom discovered that a 
range of private, governmental, and community organizations could 
succeed “when well matched to local settings and involving the active 
participation of local users.”32 Ostrom identified “structural factors” that 
could explain the successful management and cooperation for public 
goods through non-public institutions.33 
The focus on institutional choices for governing exchange also 
influenced scholars to explore what institutions should govern modern 
production. Modularity, which companies use to  
 
break[] up a complex system into discrete pieces—which can 
then communicate with one another only through standardized 
interfaces within a standardized architecture—[to] eliminate 
what would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of 
systemic interconnections.34 
 
Modularity can be explained as an institutional choice for governing 
production.35 But, modularity as an institutional choice became less 
popular as it became apparent that modularity kept companies from 
innovating—they had to limit innovations that would not work with the 
standard interfaces.36 Thus, institutional choice was governed by a cost 
comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of modularity. 
Macaulay’s recognition of institutional choice led other scholars to 
explore what factors could make alternate institutions—such as network 
governance—work when some elements—such as trust or social capital— 
 
 29.  Lamoreaux, Raff & Temin, supra note 21, at 408.  
 30.  See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of 
Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641 (2010); NORTH, supra note 7, at 6, 
26. 
 31.  Ostrom, supra note 30, at 642. 
 32.  Id. at 663–64. 
 33.  Id. at 642.  
 34.  Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 19, 19 (2000). 
35.  See id. 
 36.  Id. at 26. 
2021:385 A Paradigm Shift 391 
were absent.37 In short, he opened up a whole world of alternative 
governance. By studying the preconditions for the success of informal 
governance in relational contracts, Macaulay led scholars to see that firms 
could provide the same kind of information transmission through a party’s 
position in a network, “reduc[ing] the need for firms to employ costly 
governance mechanisms.”38 
Macaulay’s work on how relational contracts might function in one 
setting led subsequent scholars to examine how the same kinds of 
information transmission mechanisms characteristic of relational contracts 
could succeed in a different setting through information transmission in a 
network.39 Macaulay explored what characteristics of relational contracts 
made informal governance possible; that insight led others to explore how 
those characteristics could be created with different institutions.40 
A. Comparative Cost Analysis 
Implicit in Macaulay’s institutional choice paradigm is a cost 
comparison strategy for determining other choices, including how to 
organize a firm, whether to make or buy products, and how to structure 
contracts.41 If contract law as a coercive sanction fails to serve the parties 
in an exchange and is therefore dysfunctional, parties may turn to informal 
enforcement depending on the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
doing so.42 
That insight—that parties would adopt private strategies to achieve 
their goals when the costs of one type of institution outweighed the 
advantages—influenced design choices made in the supply chain,43 
 
37.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and 
Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 576 (2015).  
 38.  Id. at 599.  
39.  See id.; Ostrom, supra note 30; NORTH, supra note 7; see also Macaulay, 
supra note 1. 
40.  See Macaulay, supra note 1; Bernstein, supra note 37, at 599; Ostrom, supra 
note 30; NORTH, supra note 7, at 6, 36. 
 41.  Implicit in Macaulay’s work is a cost minimization paradigm which 
prefigures current studies in neuroscience of the brain’s reaction to cost minimization tools. 
See Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How 
Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9, 48–49 (2005). 
 42.  See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the 
Complexities of Contract, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV. 507, 509 (1977) (He used a cost benefit 
analysis in examining the use or non-use of contract (litigation) in the following statement: 
“that economic actors will employ the litigation process to settle disputes only to the extent 
that (1) the present value of continuing relationships is low, and (2) the anticipated return 
from the litigation process is high.”), cited in David Campbell, What Do We Mean By the 
Non-Use of Contract?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART 
MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL, supra note 6, at 159, 168. 
43.  The costs Macaulay defined included damage to the relationship, reduced 
flexibility, and litigation costs. Macaulay, supra note 1, at 64. 
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Williamson’s discriminating alignment thesis,44 and Komesar’s work on 
choosing between imperfect alternatives.45 
In the supply chain, governance choices and a comparative cost 
analysis explain how parties select what type of contract will govern their 
relationship. Some parties opt out of using long-term agreements (LTAs) 
in certain contexts while opting to use them in others. Empirical data 
suggests that parties opt in more frequently when there are large sunk costs 
involved.46 The LTA may be adopted only if the benefits outweigh the 
costs.47 Suppliers calculate that, where large sunk costs are present, the 
LTA protects those investments and that that protection outweighs the 
negative, onerous provisions of an LTA.48 
Comparative cost analysis can also explain new governance choices 
in innovation contracts. Although Matthew Jennejohn rationalizes new 
governance provisions as providing an architecture necessary for solving 
“multivalent” problems—such as institutionalizing learning and 
preventing entropy—Jennejohn’s theory also explains governance 
provisions as a cost-minimizing way to avoid entropy.49 Where 
coordination problems are complex, the provisions to institutionalize 
learning can “keep the joint learning process moving on track.”50 Parties 
use these devices to get the most out of resources. By devising processes 
like benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection, parties 
in innovative manufacturing can lower the costs of production and even 
identify new sources of value.51 Therefore, they are preferable under a 
comparative cost analysis. 
Macaulay’s comparative cost approach to institutional choice 
influenced scholars studying the design choices of parties in the global 
supply chain. Parties implement proactive institutions such as 
benchmarking and simultaneous engineering52 when they offer more 
advantages than an ex post inspection process.53 Alternative systems, such 
 
44.  See infra p. 393 and note 55. 
45.  See infra p. 393 and notes 58–61. 
 46.  See Juliet P. Kostritsky & Jessica Ice, Why Choose LTAs? An Empirical 
Study of Ohio Manufacturers’ Contractual Choices Through a Bargaining Lens, 9 AM. U. 
BUS. L. REV. 337, 337 (2020). 
47.  Id. at 357. 
48.  Id. at 338. 
49.  Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 281, 313 (2016). 
 50.  Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83, 144–46 (2008). 
 51.  Bernstein, supra note 37, at 565. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  See Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 9, at 39.  
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as ones where manufacturers discover problems only when the assembly 
lines shut down because of a defective piece, would be more costly.54 
The comparative cost analysis of institutional choice underlies 
Williamson’s discriminating alignment thesis. Under his theory, parties 
will “align transactions (which differ in their attributes) with governance 
structures (which differ in their costs and competencies) in a 
discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way.”55 Macaulay 
directly influenced Williamson by linking institutional choice to the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of an institutional choice.56 
Williamson further explored how the confluence of bounded rationality, 
sunk costs, and opportunism would interfere with contractual solutions, 
giving other institutional solutions a comparative cost advantage.57 
This comparative cost approach led Neil Komesar to stress that, in 
assessing solutions to a problem, such as an externality problem, the costs 
and benefits of different institutions must be examined comparatively to 
see which imperfect institution would prevail.58 This comparative analysis 
further examines whether the market, the courts, or the legislature would 
be best equipped to solve the problem.59 When analyzing this issue, 
Komesar looks at the impediments to contractual solutions, including 
information, the number of participants, and how the benefits or stakes 
were distributed.60 Komesar then assesses these factors in different 
institutional settings.61 The comparative approach also influenced 
Williamson’s remediableness approach, but he is generally assessing 
market solutions against hierarchy and ruling out judicial solutions.62 
Finally, comparative cost assessment influenced Barak Richman to 
assess the relative costs of private legal systems and public courts.63 
Although private legal systems enjoy certain adjudicative cost advantages 
over public court systems, public court systems enjoy enforcement 
advantage costs.64 Richman argues that some of the costs of private legal 
systems have been ignored, including the fact that private enforcement is 
 
54.  Id.  
 55.  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 46–47 (1996) 
[hereinafter MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE]; see also Williamson, supra note 10, at 6 (“A 
predictive theory of economic organization resides in the hypothesis that transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their 
costs and competencies, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction-cost-economizing result.”). 
56.  MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 12. 
57.  Id. at 6, 12. 
 58.  NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 102, 106–07 (1994).  
59.  Id. at 108, chs. 3–5. 
 60.  Id. at 100, 103, 106–07, 109.  
61.  Id. at chs. 3–5. 
 62.  MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 7, 10, 13. 
 63.  Richman, supra note 4, at 762–66.  
64.  Id. at 758. 
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costly because “it can only reach those who subscribe to it.”65 Richman’s 
central premises that “all institutional arrangements exhibit certain 
efficiencies and costs” and that “[a] comparative assessment of public 
versus private enforcement requires assessing the institutional capacities 
of each mechanism”66 follow directly from Macaulay’s work on 
comparative institutional governance. 
B. Institutional Choice and Comparative Governance: How Informal and 
Formal Enforcement Interact and Combine 
Macaulay’s comparative analysis of alternative institutions in 
exchange led scholars to new insights on why and how firms might 
combine their use of formal and informal enforcement. Parties no longer 
faced a binary choice between formal and informal enforcement; before 
Macaulay, the interest in how informal and formal mechanisms interacted 
had not been on the radar because it was assumed that law could 
effortlessly solve problems.67 Accordingly, Macaulay’s interest in 
nonlegal institutions opened up a richer world of informal enforcement. 
His foundational work delineated contexts where informal enforcement is 
likely to succeed and anticipated those in which it might need to be 
supplemented and also raised new questions about how informal and 
formal enforcement might interact.68 
Studies of the movie industry provide one example of the disparate 
use of formal and informal contracts in different contexts. Evidence shows 
that distributors rely on informal enforcement when opportunism risk is 
low due to the low revenue potential of certain movies but rely on formal 
contracts when risk of opportunism is high.69 Thus, the choice is not 
always binary, and the parties’ choices of formal and informal 
enforcement as competing governance strategies will depend on the 
 
 65.  Id. at 764. 
 66.  Id. at 763.  
67.  See Mertz & Friedman, supra note 2, 15–17. 
 68.  Barak Richman situates Macaulay’s informal adjustment as operating in the 
shadow of the law rather than wholly outside the legal system. See Richman, supra note 4, 
at 744 (citing Macaulay, supra note 4, at 62). The important contribution Macaulay made 
was to highlight informal enforcement. Although Macaulay contemplated law as a 
backstop, once informal enforcement became a variable, law might or might not play a role 
depending on the context. See Stewart Macaulay, The Standardized Contracts of United 
States Automobile Manufacturers, in STEWART MACAULAY: SELECTED WORKS, supra note 
2, at 69 (discussing law as a last resort). 
69.  Ricard Gil & Giorgio Zanarone, Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory 
and Evidence, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141, 149–50 (2017). 
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potential for opportunistic behavior.70 A choice for formal enforcement 
may also vary with “the strength of self-enforcement.”71 
The choice between formal and informal enforcement, as institutional 
choices, will also depend on other factors such as whether a matter is 
verifiable to a court.72 An employer will pay a fixed wage based on output, 
a matter verifiable to a court.73 But for non-verifiable matters that depend 
on effort,74 the employer may pay a bonus that will depend on informal 
enforcement; this will depend on the continuity of relations and the 
difficulty of replacing the employee. 
The pathbreaking work of Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert 
Scott (GSS) on the braiding of formal and informal enforcement follows 
directly from Macaulay’s work. Like Macaulay, GSS assumed that formal 
contracts oriented to performance obligations were of limited value.75 In 
Macaulay’s case, the cost of legal enforcement rendered contract 
enforcement useless or counterproductive; in GSS’s innovation contracts, 
performance obligations could not be devised because of the uncertainty 
regarding the ultimate innovated product.76 Like Macaulay’s business 
people, contractors in the GSS contracts turn to an alternative means of 
governance: they create formal information-sharing protocols to generate 
information that would facilitate informal enforcement, helping to 
“endogenize” trust.77 
Macaulay found a world in which parties in a set of relational 
contracts ignore formal contracts and rely on the institutional alternative 
of informal enforcement; his insights influenced GSS. Like Macaulay’s 
businesspeople, parties in the GSS innovation contract do not rely on 
formal contracts for provisions that courts can enforce, so they share a 
distrust of legal centralism.78 GSS’s innovation contractors also turn to an 
alternative to formal contract enforcement and rely on information-sharing 
mechanisms as an institution that can generate the information needed for 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 147 n.3 (citing Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Costly 
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73.  See Gil & Zanarone, supra note 69, at 142–46. 
 74.  Id.; see also David E. M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent 
Relationships, 62 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 62 (1991). 
75.  See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for 
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
454–55 (2009). 
 76.  Id. at 448 (discussing the problem of “continuous uncertainty”). 
 77.  Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The 
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COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1386 (2010). 
78.  See id. at 1397–98. 
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informal enforcement.79 In Macaulay’s world, the informal enforcement 
operates outside of formal contract,80 but in the GSS world, a contract 
whose main function is to facilitate informal enforcement creates an 
information-sharing institution.81 By studying how informal enforcement 
could be created under conditions of trust and reputational sanctions, 
Macaulay led GSS to imagine different scenarios in which the 
preconditions for informal enforcement could be created through a formal 
contract that did not depend on enforcing performance obligations.  
By exploring informal enforcement outside of contract as an 
alternative institution to formal contract enforcement, Macaulay prompted 
later studies of how informal and formal contracts might interact in ways 
that were inconceivable when legal enforcement sanctions prevailed as the 
solution to contract disputes. 
C. Implication of Paradigmatic Institutional Choice: Functional Focus 
of Exchange 
Macaulay’s underlying analysis of parties’ institutional choices led to 
a focus on contract, or its alternatives, as a means of conducting exchange. 
This reoriented contract scholarship away from a doctrinal to a functional 
focus. 
By separating contract from legal sanctions and emphasizing 
contracts as devices for conducting exchange, scholars began to rethink 
contracts. Macaulay’s emphasis on contracts as devices for conducting 
exchange, and his liberation of contract law from the coercive sanctions 
associated with classical contract law, caused scholars to rethink the role 
of contract in transactions.82 Parties might enter into contracts whose 
provisions were designed to create a “work-a-day” framework for 
resolving issues internally83 and to keep law as a coercive sanction out of 
the exchange.84 Law as risk allocation or as an enforcement mechanism 
for performance obligations became less important.85 
Macaulay emphasized choosing governance based on what strategy 
would best suit the relationship, which led others to rethink whether a new 
form of contract, conceptualized as a how-to framework for procurement, 
could itself serve as a low-cost alternative strategy to contract sanctions 
 
79.  Id. at 1377, 1386. 
80.  See Macaulay, supra note 1, at 62–65. 
81.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 77, at 1408–09. 
82.  See, e.g., id. at 1387–88. 
 83.  Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 9, at 1, 40. 
 84.  See Email from Lisa Bernstein, Professor, Univ. of Chicago, to Juliet 
Kostritsky, Professor, Case W. Rsrv. Univ. (Mar. 1, 2020, 12:39 PM) (on file with author).  
 85.  Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 75, at 449.  
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that could yield value to the relationship.86 That functional focus 
influenced scholars like Jennejohn to consider how particular problems in 
an alliance, such as spillover, could be governed by an institution set up in 
a contract, such as unanimous committee decision-making.87 This could 
solve a problem like misappropriation of intellectual property better than 
alternatives because it more clearly delineates the boundaries of 
foreground IP.88 A functional focus driving institutional choice also 
influences contract design theorists like GSS, who see the contract 
information transfer mechanisms as institutions or structures as a 
functional solution to opportunism and uncertainty problems.89 
D. Private Governance: Facts, Origins, Examples, Purposes, and Limits 
Macaulay’s work on an alternate means of governance led scholars 
to explore how parties could operate by creating their “own rules.”90 
Macaulay made these self-regulating networks a fact to be reckoned with: 
He inspired studies of successful private governance which led to the view 
that private governance, is not only a fact, but a normatively superior way 
to conduct exchange.91 His work also led scholars to explore how parties 
could operate more effectively by creating private systems for 
enforcement and governance. 
Macaulay’s understanding of this expanded scope of informal 
governance inspired Lisa Bernstein’s study of the diamond industry,92 
Robert Ellickson’s study of the Shasta County cattle dispute 
mechanisms,93 and Avner Greif’s study of merchant traders.94 Macaulay’s 
work, however, did more than simply inspire studies of functioning private 
governance; it also caused scholars to address the fundamental questions 
of why private ordering arose and identify the preconditions for the 
success or failure of such governance. 
 
86.  See, e.g., id. at 449–51. 
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 92.  Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).  
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Macaulay’s focus on private governance through informal adjustment 
as an alternative institution to formal contract enforcement also launched 
the innovative work on contract design by scholars like GSS, Bernstein, 
and Jennejohn. Macaulay had imagined that developing social capital 
would occur entirely outside of contract in relational contracts.95 That 
foundational work led contract innovation scholars to study how 
governance techniques and institutions like information-sharing protocols 
could artificially create trust even where it was not preexisting or part of a 
relational contract.96 These governance mechanisms were institutions 
within contracts—and thus were different from Macaulay’s informal 
adjustment outside of a contract—but they were not contractual since they 
were often not enforceable and did not depend on enforcing performance 
obligations.97 Like Macaulay’s informal adjustment mechanisms, they 
were enforced informally through “interior-remedies” and operated 
outside of law.98  
Macaulay’s view on the limits of legal enforcement influenced 
Williamson’s recognition of “the limitations of legal centralism.”99 Other 
scholars explain such governance as a response to lawlessness or weak 
enforcement by the state.100 In eleventh-century international trade, when 
the central state was weak, traders employing agents over long distances 
needed to control divergence and shirking by those agents in order to 
prevent the losses in gains to trade.101 Consequently, they developed 
practices to sanction cheating agents by using a collective private 
enforcement mechanism that prohibited traders from hiring any such 
agents.102 This practice was enforced using multilateral sanctions.103 Greif 
explained the rise of these arrangements in terms of transaction cost 
economics.104 The private alternate governance responded to the costs of 
complete contracts to govern the agent and the cost of legal 
enforcement.105 The system provided value to both traders and agents and 
 
95.  Macaulay, supra note 1, at 63. 
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103.  Id. 
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helped to prevent the losses that would otherwise occur.106 The 
comparatively superior ability of parties to solve problems better than 
generalist courts anchors Galanter’s explanation for private governance.107 
The unavailability of sanctions within certain relationships—like the intra-
firm employer-employee relationship—explains why informal relational 
contract governance arises in that setting.108 
Macaulay’s work on private governance not only explains why 
governance arises but also identifies the preconditions for its success. He 
emphasized a shared understanding of the parties’ primary obligations and 
a standardized product.109 By identifying those core factors, Macaulay 
caused others to explore whether private governance could succeed under 
other conditions and, if so, whether the elements of private governance 
would be different. Would informal adjustment succeed in other settings, 
or would alternative institutions—such as formal information-sharing 
protocols or managerial provisions—work in new contexts of innovation 
in alliances? Macaulay’s work on successful governance led others to 
systematically explore what factors make private governance possible, 
including repeat play, sanctioning capabilities, close-knit groups, and 
information transmission. 
Although private governance is now seen as a fact,110 Macaulay’s 
view that institutions like contract and judicial remedies could fail and that 
other institutions would evolve in response to failure suggests that 
institutional choice will, too, evolve in response to that failure.111 This 
suggestion led others to examine not only the fact of failure but also to 
explore why and when failure would occur.112 Some factors influencing 
success or failure are organizational or bureaucratic, and some are based 
on behavioral proclivities, such as opportunistic behavior.113 Institutions 
will adjust, and success may depend on other institutional supports. 
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Following Macaulay’s insights into institutional failure, Josh 
Whitford pursued an analysis of why supply chain contracts could fail.114 
That happens when there is overreach by OEMs and suppliers respond by, 
in Whitford’s words, “partial adoption” and hedging and withholding 
information.115 Whitford found that failure may also be due to factional 
conflicts within an organization that make one party, who is theoretically 
committed to collaboration and information sharing, hold back.116 These 
failures may be due to persistent contradictions within firms that 
undermine the success of these new institutions.117 
Macaulay’s approach suggests that there are limits of private 
governance.118 His focus on the preconditions for the success of private 
governance, such as information transmission and credible sanctions, 
suggests that, when those preconditions are absent, private governance 
may fail or need to be supplemented. That may explain why institutions 
such as rating agencies arise when information transmission and sanctions 
are not present.119 
E. A Renewed Interest in Norms 
Macaulay’s focus on two widely accepted norms, honoring 
commitments and producing a good product, fits into the institutional 
choice paradigm shift.120 These norms often render resort to the law 
unnecessary and reflect implicit methods of devising solutions to the 
problems of cooperation and exchange.121 Macaulay’s scholarship laid the 
groundwork for viewing norms as implicit, instrumental, and institutional 
choices to solve problems when contracts or other devices are not 
available, too costly, or otherwise dysfunctional.122 The parties weigh the 
costs and benefits of governing their exchange by norms and compare 
those costs and benefits123 to other arrangements “to determine the optimal 
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mix of formal and informal arrangements.”124 This instrumental view of 
norms as problem-solving devices facilitated understanding norms as 
implicit ways parties can deal with other exchange problems, such as 
uncertainty. Accordingly, Macaulay’s work influenced Douglass North to 
explore how norms can lower uncertainty by establishing “the framework 
within which human interaction takes place.”125 
The focus on norms as problem-solving devices and institutions and 
cost-comparative analysis influenced scholars to postulate that particular 
norms regarding standardized weights and measures could also reduce the 
costs of exchange and increase gains from trade.126 Other scholars saw 
norms as solutions to collective action problems and a means for finding 
cost-effective solutions to joint problems; in short, they thought norms 
could create solutions to the driving coordination problem.127 
Macaulay’s interest in norms as governance institutions in exchange 
launched other scholars to inquire into how norms affect behavior. When 
norms exist, parties calculate the “costs and benefits of particular 
behaviors.”128 If the party deviates from a norm, that non-adherence will 
result in lost opportunities and possible reputational losses; norms 
influence how to resolve an encounter or dispute with another party. These 
calculations affect whether the norm will work as a problem-solving 
institution. Macaulay’s insights into norms explained how norms could 
influence behavior, as parties would calculate the costs of non-adherence 
when reaching an informal adjustment. 
Norms thus function as one private governance institution to solve 
problems. At the same time, norms raise a question at the heart of all 
institutional choice: when will/should the parties invoke law, or, as Saul 
Levmore asks, what is the proper institutional “division of labor between 
law and norms?”129 Answering that question, one of whether law should 
intervene to enforce norms or, alternatively, one to see how norms might 
supplement contractual arrangements, requires an assessment of 
institutional choice at the heart of the paradigm shift. To resolve the 
intervention question, one must account for the fact that “each norm may 
achieve those goals in different ways in particular contexts, depending in 
part on the costs of alternative arrangements . . . and the particular 
advantages and disadvantages of each solution in such contexts.”130 Once 
norms are seen as part of an exchange and governance, it becomes 
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paramount to study norms, contract, and law to see how they coexist, 
interact, substitute for, and displace one another. Macaulay’s view of 
comparative institutional governance provides a rich ground for analyzing 
the normative interactions between law and norms. 
One example in which a comparative institutional analysis suggests 
that law might have a comparative advantage over norms or contracts 
exists where impediments hinder parties from solving an externality 
problem—such as the removal of dog waste by dog owners—either by 
contract or by informal norm. Because the parties are not interacting and 
cannot develop a shared norm or contract, the law may intervene to ban 
dog waste. That in turn will generate norms of social enforcement. Thus, 
where the preconditions for informal enforcement are not possible, an 
alternative may be the better option. 
Macaulay’s comparative institutional assessment can also help 
determine whether the law should mandate the incorporation of certain 
norms into contracts. Sometimes the law will decline to incorporate a 
tipping norm into an enforceable contract because that option would be 
less beneficial.131 A tipping norm can supplement a private contract of a 
restaurant that incentivizes good service and allows patrons to distinguish 
between levels of service.132 The alternative of a law-mandated gratuity 
would result in restaurants paying too much to some waiters and not 
enough to others since it would not distinguish effort levels.133 
II. THREE MORE EFFECTS BEYOND THE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
PARADIGM 
Macaulay’s work contributes to three other developments that 
represent lasting legacies of his scholarship. They include a more realistic 
model of exchange, the focus on context, and a broader role for lawyers. 
All of these developments are important in their own right, but they also 
tie into the institutional choice paradigm discussed earlier.134 
A. More Realistic Model of Exchange 
Macaulay’s view that parties would choose institutions that would 
best achieve their goals and that they would choose informal governance 
when the cost of legal enforcement outweighed any advantages 
emphasized that there are costs to legal enforcement.135 That revealed an 
imperfect world of exchange in which information and enforcement are 
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not costless. Macaulay’s empirical investigation into how businesses 
actually conducted their exchange emphasized how important realistic 
assumptions about human behavior are in devising solutions to an 
exchange problem. That recognition of the cost of legal enforcement as an 
obstacle prompted examination of other possible frictions and transaction 
costs in an exchange.136 These frictions occupied the neo-institutionalists 
and scholars of behavioral economics and led to explorations of multiple 
impediments to contracting, the inevitability of incomplete contracts, and 
possible solutions with institutional implications.137 This work thus 
suggests the relevance of behavioral economics and a deviation from the 
assumptions of classical economics that had focused on prices and the 
competitive structure of markets to lead rational parties to secure the 
information needed to maximize their utility.138 In this world of costly 
enforcement and imperfect information, Macaulay’s focus on alternative 
institutions is important because they matter in this imperfect world. 
Parties weigh the advantages and disadvantages of various solutions but 
do so in the context of frictions and imperfect enforcement. 
B. Context, Institutional Choice, and Contract Interpretation 
Macaulay’s emphasis on context139 and the details of the relationships 
of the businessmen he studied influenced others to tie particular contexts 
to institutional choices, just as he had implicitly done in linking the 
institutional choice of informal adjustment to the context of continuing 
relations.140 Economic historians followed Macaulay in studying how 
context affected the choice of institutions in the wheat industry.141 Wheat 
sacks originally identified the farmer, and buyers could purchase wheat 
based on the reputation of the farmer.142 As the wheat trade expanded 
across greater distances and wheat was shipped in railroad cars, buyers 
could no longer identify the farmer, leading to an adulteration of wheat 
quality.143 To stop the drop in prices and prevent a lemons problem,144 this 
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new context generated new institutions. For example, the Chicago Board 
of Trade developed standards for wheat quality.145 A new institution of 
government inspectors also developed to ensure objectivity and prevent 
adulterated wheat.146 Therefore, both of these institutions developed to 
solve a problem that could no longer be solved by reputational sanction. 
Another example where context also matters in institutional choice is in 
the diamond industry, where an interest in secrecy and the perception that 
expectancy damages were inadequate led the industry participants to an 
embrace of arbitration outside the legal system as the preferred 
institutional governance mechanism.147  
However, in other contexts, where there is a lack of shared 
understanding of the product required because it is new and there is no 
preexisting trust, the informal relational adjustment envisioned by 
Macaulay may not work, and a new institutional structure could be 
required. Accordingly, parties in the innovation context have adopted 
“information sharing” protocols.148 These institutional protocols solved a 
problem that the particular context of advanced manufacturing required: 
the need to monitor quality and promote early detection of problems 
through simultaneous engineering and benchmarking.149 These protocols 
also fostered “shared understandings”150 of what was required and thereby 
promoted the ability to informally enforce those expectations.151 Formal 
contract provisions responded to the context of uncertainty innovation 
contracts by creating elements that are necessary preconditions for 
informal enforcement. 
Relatedly, this focus on context has led scholars to argue that 
companies that can “develop automation methods that capitalize on their 
greater access to the context in which production data is generated” have 
a comparative advantage over digital entrants.152 Thus, the same idea that 
context affects institutional choice can also be used to analyze how value 
can best be captured from digital information and sensors on equipment. 
For example, how can a manufacturer use the data generated from robotics 
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and sensors to “capture value”? This is a type of institutional choice. If the 
manufacturer can utilize the knowledge from the floor and combine it with 
the digital information, it may be able to capture value in a superior way. 
Macaulay’s focus on context, institutional choice, and comparative cost 
laid the foundation for Susan Helper and others to assess the different ways 
companies can make use of information from sensors and robotics.153 
Which way will be best to capture value? If a company uses information 
but does not use local knowledge, it will not capture as much value as if it 
had enriched itself with local knowledge from the shop floor. That may 
lessen its comparative advantage vis-á-vis digital entrants who translate 
the data into abstract formulations that can be used across a variety of 
industries. 
Context also affects not only what institution parties will adopt but 
also whether informal adjustment as an institution will succeed or not. 
Tom Palay uses Macaulay’s insights on the importance of context to 
explain why informal adjustment may not always succeed.154 Where the 
parties’ investments are disparate,155 the investment that could otherwise 
serve as a hostage and curb opportunistic behavior will break down.156 
That focus on context has implications beyond contract design and 
institutional choice; it affects whether courts should normatively adopt a 
formalist or a contextualist approach to contract enforcement and 
interpretation. A justification for incorporating tacit assumptions and 
customs or trade usages ties back to Macaulay’s comparative institutional 
choice structure. In some instances where parties leave tacit assumptions 
out of the contract, courts may have a comparative advantage in filling 
those terms. 
Although Macaulay did not fully develop a model for supplying terms 
for incomplete contracts, his model of comparative advantage for 
analyzing institutional choice suggests that where there are frictions or 
obstacles to parties incorporating the tacit assumptions or customs and the 
court can, by incorporating them, yield more advantages than 
disadvantages, it should do so. The question is whether supplying a term 
will reduce costs for the parties by more than any costs introduced by such 
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terms and enhance welfare. This is the same calculus parties use to 
determine if one institution—contract enforcement—will result in more 
net benefits than another institution—the non-use of contract. 
C. The Role of the Lawyer and Institutional Choice Paradigm 
Renewed interest in institutions and their role in contract governance 
suggest that lawyers should have a broader role in advising clients. Instead 
of solely focusing on risk allocation provisions, lawyers need to 
understand the institution of the firm, factional conflicts, and management. 
They need to focus on whether investments in the supply chain are 
reciprocal. They need to understand network governance. They need to be 
sensitive to bureaucratic conflicts at a business, as those conflicts may 
affect performance. All will affect the success of exchanges. 
Recognition of the importance of informal adjustment, debunking the 
centrality of contract law, and the disinclination to consult contract 
documents or invoke legal sanctions suggest that lawyers need to play a 
broader role that is not geared toward formal legal enforcement of 
performance obligations and recognizes other institutional solutions to 
durable problems. One scholar has suggested that lawyers have to shift 
their focus away from contractual incentives and risk allocation to 
understanding the “management strategies used within firms to improve 
the operation of outsourcing agreements.”157 
Lawyers may also want to advise clients on the possibility of failure 
with framework contracts that are ideally designed to promote innovation 
and coordination and control opportunism. Institutions exist to serve 
certain needs, like reducing opportunism, but when the institution fails to 
achieve those purposes, parties will devise other governance structures to 
mitigate those hazards. When large OEMs act opportunistically to abuse 
the information shared by suppliers, suppliers will adopt a private strategy, 
such as hedging, to protect themselves. 
The sensitivity to the ways in which institutions or governance may 
fail derives from Macaulay’s key theory that contract sanctions may fail 
as a device to govern contractual relationships.158 That insight into how 
relationships fail may propel the lawyer into a new role. Instead of 
focusing solely on contract provisions that specify performance, the 
lawyer may advise the client that it is important to examine whether the 
investments made by both parties in a supply relationship are reciprocal. 
Are the investments made or hostages furnished in a supply relationship 
of equal value? If not, when circumstances change and prices rise 
exponentially, the adversely affected party may not have the leverage 
needed to force a concession if the hostage or investment furnished by the 
 
 157.  Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 9, at 40. 
158.  Macaulay, supra note 1, at 56. 
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counterparty is not significant. The lawyer’s role should be expanded to 
advise clients on why a reciprocity of investments may matter at the 
adjustment stage. 
Macaulay focused on the way that real people operate, how real 
businessmen operate, and how real individuals operate within firms. With 
some personnel more inclined to emphasize contract provisions (finance 
people) and other individuals (sales personnel) less inclined to emphasize 
contract, “micro-level incentives facing the employees and managers of 
both the buyer and the supplier” matter.159 Lawyers advising clients must 
sensitize them to the possibility that these conflicts between individuals 
with differing priorities at a firm can adversely impact the operation of the 
contract as (one’s client) will have to navigate dysfunction created by 
tensions between different categories of personnel.160 
CONCLUSION 
Macaulay’s empirical work established that contract law was only 
one variable among others that parties could choose to govern their 
exchange relationships. That choice in governance lens led to a paradigm 
shift in which contract went from being the inevitable and costless way of 
governing exchange to one in which comparative institutional governance 
concerns determine when parties choose one institution over another. It 
also influenced scholars to study private governance systems to determine 
why they arose, the preconditions for success, and the potential for failure. 
It also engendered studies of how informal and formal enforcement could 
combine and interact while exploring when formal enforcement might 
need to supplement informal enforcement. Macaulay’s focus on two 
widely accepted norms led to studies of how norms might operate to solve 
the problems of cooperation and exchange. Macaulay’s recognition of cost 
in parties’ choices in institutional governance influenced more realistic 
models of exchange. His focus on how the context of relational contracts 
influenced governance in exchange led others to study how other contexts 
influenced institutional choices across a wide spectrum, from the wheat 
industry to innovation contracts. Finally, Macaulay’s institutional 
paradigm shift suggests a broader role for lawyers who must pay attention 
to networks and other informal enforcement mechanisms that might 
replace formal sanctions. 
 
 
 159.  Bernstein & Peterson, supra note 9, at 40. 
 160.  WHITFORD, supra note 112, at 112, 115 (noting “inconsistent incentives, 
departmental infighting and factional disagreements over firm strategy”). 
